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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL ENRIQUE BRACERO 
ARTURO RUIZ, 
Case No. 981529-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal of charges against the defendants. 
The charges were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the trial court's pre-trial finding that 
defendants were subject to an illegal search and seizure and ordered evidence seized in the 
illegal search be suppressed. This Court has jurisdiction of the State's appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1 
Issue: Whether the trial court correctly found that Officer Metz lacked reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his detention of the defendants past 
the original traffic stop? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling 
on a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. 
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Patefield. Case No. 950736 (Utah App. 1996)(citing State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 
1186 (Utah 1995); State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992). Clear error 
will be found only when the trial court's factual findings run against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Id. (citing Castner, 825 P.2d at 702). Questions of law are purely 
legal issues that are reviewed for correctness with no particular deference afforded to 
the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 
138 (Utah App. 1996). 
Issue #2 
Issue: Whether Officer Metz's warrantless search of Mr. Bracero's vehicle was 
supported by probable cause? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Questions regarding a trial court's determination of 
whether a particular set of facts constitutes probably cause are reviewed 
"nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial court." 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995). Regarding consent to search, 
the ultimate conclusion on whether there was consent, a legal question, is reviewed de 
novo. Whether exigent circumstances existed is a question of fact which are not 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, and defendant Bracero was also charged with driving on suspension, a 
class C misdemeanor, and speeding, a class C misdemeanor. 
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Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search 
(R. 16-15,15-27). The state opposed the motion (R. 44-37). An evidentiary hearing was 
held on defendant's motion on 12 January 1998. The trial court granted the motion to 
suppress by written ruling (R. 75-71). 
The State filed an objection and motion to reconsider and defendants filed an 
opposing memorandum (R. 78, 80, 86-83, 94-90). The trial court summarily denied the 
motion to reconsider (R.97-96). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered on 14 August 1998 (R. 152-150). With no evidence against the defendants, the trial 
court dismissed all charges with prejudice (R. 157-156). The state filed timely notice of 
appeal (R. 159-58). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On the morning of November 14, 1997, just after 9:00 a.m., the defendants were 
traveling north bound on 1-15 south of Nephi. Mr. Bracero was driving and noticed a Utah 
Highway Patrol Car on the side of the road up ahead on the uphill grade he was pulling south 
of the city of Nephi. He glanced at his speedometer, which only goes up to 80 mph, to make 
sure he was not violating the speed limit. Mr. Bracero's speedometer read 73 mph (R. 160: 
49).] 
2. Officer Metz was in the Highway Patrol car ahead of defendants on 1-15 and reported 
a radar reading on the defendants car of 82 mph. The Defendants are of Latin decent and 
their vehicle, a brown Ford Tempo, has California license plates (R. 160: 50). 
5. Officer Metz pulled out behind defendants car as they passed. Mr. Bracero made sure 
to keep his speed below the posted maximum, frequently checking his speedometer. Officer 
1
 The cover page of the suppression hearing transcript is numbered "160." The subsequent pages 
retain their original numbering. Therefore, pages of that transcript will be numbered in this brief as "R. 
160: [internal page number]." 
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Metz continued to follow the defendants for several minutes and miles, finally pulling 
defendants over (R. 160: 49-50). 
6. Officer Metz made contact with Mr. Bracero, informing him that he had been stopped 
for speeding and asked for his license and registration. Mr. Bracero protested the speeding 
accusation, but quickly provided a California drivers license and California registration (R. 
160: 50). 
7. Defendants had a cellular phone and maps in the console area of the car. Officer 
Metz reports that the back seat and side panels appeared loose and dirty and that he could 
smell air freshener strongly in defendants' vehicle. The trial court ruled after taking 
testimony and viewing a video of the defendants car that Officer Metz did not have these 
facts available to him when he decided to search the vehicle. Metz could not possibly even 
see them until after he searched the vehicle (R. 160: 73). 
8. Officer Metz tried to explain were gaps between several pieces of molding in the 
interior of defendants car had made him suspicious of drug activity. Yet, upon cross 
examination while viewing a video of what he was able to see, Metz was shown that where 
he claimed to see gaps was a single solid piece of molding covering the entire area in 
question. Metz could not then further explain what gaps he saw in the molding, except to say 
he could no longer recall where the gaps were (R. 160: 27-38). 
9. Officer Metz asked the passenger, Mr. Ruiz, for identification and he provided his US 
Certificate of Citizenship (R. 160: 15). 
10. Officer Metz returned to his car to request information about the defendants form 
dispatch. Mr. Bracero was watching Officer Metz in his rear view mirror and saw him make 
a motion, which Bracero took to mean that the Officer wanted him to come back to the patrol 
car. After Bracero exited his vehicle, Officer Metz motioned for him to stop and go back to 
his vehicle (R. 160:51). 
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11. Officer Metz received the criminal history of both defendants. Mr. Ruiz has a prior 
drug conviction in California, and Mr. Bracero has assault and larceny charge on his record. 
Defendants had no outstanding warrants. 
12. Mr. Bracero had not made it back to his vehicle when Officer Metz got out of the 
patrol car and approached Bracero. Metz informed him that his license was suspended, of 
which Bracero was not aware. Metz asked him about his criminal record, to which Bracero 
responded candidly. Metz then informed Bracero of Mr. Ruiz's prior drug offense and asked 
how long he had known him. Bracero replied he had known Mr. Ruiz for three months (R. 
160: 52). 
13. Metz told defendant Bracero that Ruiz' prior drug conviction made him suspect 
there were drugs in the vehicle (R. 160: 40). 
14. Officer Metz told Bracero he thought there were drugs in the car. Metz asked 
Bracero if there were any drugs or weapons in the car. Bracero replied that there were not. 
Metz then told Bracero to put his hands behind his back, informing him that he was not under 
arrest, but merely detaining him so he would not run (R. 160: 52). 
15. Mr. Ruiz, still in the passenger seat looking ahead, heard the hand cuffs click and 
turned to look out the back window to see Bracero cuffed. Officer Metz then told Bracero he 
was going to search the car. Bracero did not respond (R. 160: 52-53, 87). The trial court 
found that Bracero had given consent to search the vehicle (R. 150). 
16. Officer Metz removed the keys from defendants car and brought them back to the 
trunk to attempt to open it. The key turned freely in the cylinder without releasing the trunk 
latch (R. 160:53). 
17. Officer Metz approached Mr. Ruiz and asked, "how many pounds do you have this 
time." Metz then put the key in the ignition and had Ruiz open the glove box to release the 
trunk latch with the button located there (R. 160: 57, 88). 
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18. Bracero, cuffed on the side of the car, and Ruiz watching through the rear and side 
windows of the car, watched as Officer Metz went through the contents of the trunk. Three 
unopened bottles of beer, clothing and personal items, were found in the bags that belonged 
to Bracero. A large bag was identified by Bracero as belonging to Ruiz (R. 160: 54-56). 
19. Officer Metz took the Ruiz's bag to the front of the car and had Ruiz exit the vehicle 
to the front of the car and went through the bag. No contraband was found (R. 160: 56-57). 
20. Officer Metz then searched the glove box. He found food items, a couple screw 
drivers, brake fluid, spray cleaner, and cassette tapes. Metz then removed the back seat, 
finding nothing, he probed the side panels by removing a plastic cover where an optional 
ashtray could be installed, sticking his arm in the hole. He found nothing (R. 160: 56-57). 
21. Officer Paul Mangelson arrived at the scene. Defendants both watched as 
Mangelson tapped the outside of defendants vehicle with his fist in the passenger area. 
Feeling something, Mangelson again removed the covers on the passenger panels and 
reaching through felt a bag. The panels were then removed completely, marijuana could now 
be smelled. Approximately 31 pounds of marijuana were found behind the panels of 
defendants car (R. 160: 24-25). 
22. According to both Metz and Ruiz, at no time prior to the actual arrest of defendants 
- and already after contraband was found — did either officer know that defendant Ruiz did 
not have a valid license or otherwise could not legally drive the vehicle (R. 160: 39, 86). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that Officer Metz lacked reasonable suspicion to justify 
expanding the scope and detention of the initial traffic investigation. Instead of following 
standard procedure by citing Mr. Bracero for his driving violations, Officer Metz 
immediately expanded his investigation to include drug smuggling. 
Officer Metz based his suspicion on facts that were properly rejected by the trial 
court. First, the trial court rejected Metz's testimony that he noticed gapped interior panels; 
second, the trial court rejected Metz's testimony that he saw a cell phone and maps resting in 
the console area. The only remaining facts at the time Metz made his decision to detain the 
vehicle and which support his detention were the smell of air freshener and the fact that 
neither occupant was the registered owner of the car. These facts are too slim a reed to base a 
decision to detain the vehicle. 
The trial court's ruling is well-grounded in Utah Case law. 
In addition to the Defendants' primary argument that the trial court correctly ruled on 
the issue of reasonable suspicion, the Defendants also argue that Officer Metz did not have 
probable cause to justify a warrantless search of the automobile. Defendant Bracero 
contested that Officer Metz ever asked for or was given consent to search the vehicle. 
Without such consent, Metz lacked the specific information or the exigent circumstances that 
may have justified a warrantless search. 
Wherefore, the Defendants urge this Court to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the 
information. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BEYOND THE 
INITIAL PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
A. Officer Metz Exceeded the Scope and the Detention of the Stop 
In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court articulated a 
two prong test to determine whether a routine traffic stop can withstand constitutional 
scrutiny: 
1. Was the police officer's action "justified at is inception"? 
2. Was the resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place"? 
(citation omitted). 
Id, 873 P. 2d at 1131-32. 
In the case at hand, the Defendants do not challenge the trial court's finding that 
Officer Metz was justified in stopping the vehicle due to speeding (even though Bracero's 
testimony indicated that he was barely exceeding the posted limit by one or two miles per 
hour). Since the stop itself is not challenged, the questions before this Court involve the 
second prong of the Lopez test, dealing with the proper scope of the initial stop and when the 
detention "lasted longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990), disagreed with on other grounds, Lopez, 873 
P .2dat l l34n . 3. 
To begin, the trial court found that Officer Metz "lacked reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity sufficient to justify his detention of the defendants past the original traffic 
stop." (Findings of Fact at 3). As a matter of common sense - and implicit in the trial court's 
findings - it appears that the illegality began after Officer Metz had the opportunity to write a 
speeding ticket and, once finding that Bracero's license was suspended, write a ticket for that. 
According to Lopez: 
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Once a traffic stop is made the detention 'must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop.' Both the "length and [the] scope of the detention 
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' by the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
135 (citations omitted). 
Here, Officer Metz testified that he pulled the Defendants over for speeding and that 
during the course of the speeding investigation he found that Mr. Bracero's driver's license 
had been suspended. (R. 160: 15-17). Metz testified that sometimes he cites suspended 
drivers and that other times he lets them go on their way, partly depending upon whether 
another occupant can take-over driving duties. (R. 160: 39). However, in this case Officer 
Metz did not even bother to ask Mr. Bracero's driving companion, Mr. Ruiz, whether he had 
a valid driver's license. IdL 
Instead of following standard procedure by citing Mr. Bracero for speeding and 
asking Mr. Ruiz whether he had a valid driver's license so he could take over driving duties, 
Officer Metz immediately expanded his speeding investigation into a drug smuggling 
investigation. During direct examination, Officer Metz testified that during the first "minute 
to two minutes" of his speeding investigation his suspicions were raised by the scent of an air 
freshener and the presence of a cellular phone and maps in the console area. (R. 160: 15). 
Officer Metz also claimed to have noticed that the vehicle had loose interior panels. 
The trial court was unpersuaded by the facts upon which Officer Metz claimed to 
have relied upon in forming his reasonable suspicion. Most importantly, the trial court did 
not reject the notion that Metz lacked reasonable suspicion merely because these facts were 
not persuasive enough, but with respect to Metz's testimony regarding the map, cell phone 
and loose interior panel, the court did not believe Officer Metz. The trial court ruled that 
Metz "could not have seen the map or cell phone when he looked in the car." (Findings of 
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Fact at 2) In addition, Metz "could not explain which panels were gapped," and "his 
recollection of the event was too tenuous upon which to base a continued detention." Id. 
Based upon the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, the trail court found that 
Officer Metz "lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his 
detention of the defendants past the original traffic stop." (Findings of Fact at 3). Once the 
occupants satisfied the purposes of the initial stop, Officer Metz should have let them 
proceed. See State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting State v. 
Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990)). 
B. Utah Case Law on What Constitutes Reasonable Suspicion 
The trial court's finding that Officer Metz lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a 
continued detention past the original traffic stop is consistent with established Utah case law. 
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), a deputy observed the defendant's 
vehicle drift into the emergency lane two times. See id. at 653. Reasonably suspecting the 
operator of driving under the influence, the deputy pulled the vehicle over but soon found 
that the defendant was not intoxicated. Nonetheless, the deputy proceeded to expand the 
scope of his drunk driving investigation. 
To justify expanding the scope of his initial investigation, the deputy testified to the 
following factors: that he noticed the driver was visibly nervous; that the occupant did not 
have a driver's license; that neither one of the occupants was the registered owner of the car; 
and that the route they were driving was not the most direct route for their claimed 
destination. See id at 654. The deputy then ran an NCIC check on the driver's identification 
which proved negative. Finally, the deputy asked whether there were any firearms, 
contraband, or alcohol in the vehicle. One of the occupants replied, "No, but if you'd like to 
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check, go ahead." The ensuing search of the vehicle revealed four kilograms of cocain. See 
id. at 654-655. However, this Court held that there were no facts supporting a finding of 
reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the continued detention. 
Similarly, in State v. Robinson, this Court held that after the purpose of a traffic stop 
had been completed, "[a]nY further temporary detention for investigative questioning . . . is 
justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion 
of serious criminal activity." Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. 
In Robinson, the driver made an abrupt lane change which nearly resulted in a 
collision. Id at 433. After giving the driver a warning for the illegal lane change, the 
following factors were set forth to justify the continued detention: one of the defendants 
appeared to be nervous and avoided eye contact; the other defendant was talkative and 
evasive about questions concerning the van; there was a homemade bed in the back of the 
van; there was no cold-weather gear, despite the time of year and that their destination was 
Wyoming; and, finally, the defendants could not produce written permission to use the 
vehicle and the officers were unable to contact the van's owner to confirm its permissive use. 
See id. at 435-36. 
Despite the apparent strength of these factors, this Court held that such factors did not 
give rise to reasonable suspicion: 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in its 
findings that the troopers had the reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity necessary to justify their continued detention 
and questioning of [the defendants] once the warning citation 
had been given and the purposes of the initial stop had been 
accomplished. Defendant's detention after that point was, 
therefore, a violation of their fourth amendment rights. 
Id at 436-37. 
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The clarity and strength of Utah case law on the issue of unlawful detention required 
the trial court in this case to find in favor of the Defendants and to rule that Officer Metz 
lacked reasonable suspicion. In order to justify detention, the officer "must point to specific, 
articulable facts, which together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime." 
State v. Carner, 812 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1338 (Utah 
1992)(quoting State v. Truiilo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)). 
The unlawful detention in this case began at the point Officer Metz departed from 
normal procedure. Instead of simply citing Mr. Bracero for speeding and asking his 
companion, Mr. Ruiz, if he had a valid license so he could drive, Metz instead plunged 
directly into a drug smuggling investigation. Since the trial court rejected significant parts of 
Metz's testimony regarding what factors he used to build his reasonable suspicion, the 
remaining factors were not enough. The trial court merely found that (1) the defendant's car 
had an out-of-state plates; (2) that the defendants were nervous; (3) that the vehicle had an air 
freshener; and (4) that neither occupant was the registered owner of the vehicle. (Findings of 
Fact at 3). 
While none of these four factors by themselves justify a detention beyond the needs 
of the initial traffic stop, they do not get any stronger when added together. When compared 
to those factors present in Robinson or Godina-Luna, it becomes clear that the trail court 
correctly ruled in favor of the Defendants, as was done in Robinson and Godina-Luna. It 
does not matter that the State could have detained and arrested the Defendants for traffic 
violations, or that the car might have been stolen. At the time Officer Metz formed his 
reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle, he did not know whether the Defendants were 
anything more than speeders. Furthermore, any argument that the Defendants could have 
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been detained on the basis that the vehicle might have been stolen is moot. Officer Metz or 
Magelson never bothered to check with NCIC. 
The seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore, all evidence seized 
must necessarily remain suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 
State v.Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
II. OFFICER METZ'S WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CONSENT OR PROBABLE 
CAUSE 
A. Officer Metz Lacked Consent to Search 
The trial court's May 22, 1998 ruling did not reach the issue of whether the 
Defendants ever granted Officer Metz permission to search the vehicle. The court concluded 
that the detention itself was improper. Nonetheless, in its August 14, 1998, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the court stated that "the Defendants consented to the search of the 
vehicle but that search was tainted by the already existing illegal detention." The Defendants 
disagree that consent was ever granted. 
For the sake of argument, even if Metz could have detained the Defendants for 
questioning about drugs, factual discrepancies in the account given by Metz in procuring 
consent, and the defendant's testimony, combined with physical evidence, cast sufficient 
doubt on Metz's credibility so as to render his testimony inapplicable. 
Officer Metz claims that Mr. Bracero stepped out of his car and approached him while 
he was doing a record check on the defendants and their vehicle. (R. 160: 18). Metz next 
testified that he asked Mr. Bracero about his relationship to Mr. Ruiz, asked about their 
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criminal history, and then asked Mr. Bracero if he could search the car. Metz testified that 
Mr. Bracero gave consent to search. (R. 160: 20; cf R. 160: 53). Metz further testified that 
he then had Mr. Bracero get the keys to the car, open the trunk and help him go through the 
contents of the trunk. Only after searching the trunk did he place Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, 
not because he was under arrest, but for both of their protection. (R. 160: 23). 
There are several problems with this account. According to the testimony of Mr. 
Bracero, after Metz with him about the defendants criminal histories, Metz told Mr. Bracero 
that he thought there was contraband in the vehicle and he was going to search the car. (R. 
160: 53). Metz then placed Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, the closing sound of which altered 
Mr. Ruiz who was still sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Mr. Ruiz watched the 
hand cuffing through the back window of the car, something he would not have been able to 
do if the trunk was open from a search prior to Metz cuffing of Mr. Bracero, as Metz claims. 
Metz testimony was further refuted by a showing on video and by defendants' 
testimony, that the trunk of the vehicle could not be opened with the key by anyone, let alone 
a handcuffed Mr. Bracero. The only way the trunk will open is by popping the lever in the 
glove box, which Metz instructed Mr. Ruiz to do, while Mr. Bracero remained cuffed behind 
the vehicle. On cross examination concerning the opening of the trunk, Metz again appeared 
confused and unable to give a straight answer. Only on rebuttal, after listening to testimony 
about the trunk lock from both defendants and watching the video, did Metz feebly try to 
straighten-out his story. 
When looking at the totality of the circumstances and the credibility of Officer Metz's 
story, it appears that the State failed to carry its burden of proving that Mr. Bracero freely and 
voluntarily consented to the search. 
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B. Officer Metz Lacked Probable Cause 
Absent consent to search, it is well established that a warrantless search of a car is per 
se unreasonable absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. See State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). "Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances 
within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that "an 
offense has been or is being committed." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (alterations in 
original)(quoting State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). "Probable cause is an 
objective standard." IcL Thus, "determinations of whether probable cause exists require a 
common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances confronting the arresting or 
searching officer." IcL 
The totality of the circumstances of this case do not support a finding that Officer 
Metz had probable cause to search the Defendant's vehicle. Metz pulled Bracero over for 
speeding and according to Metz at no time did he suspect illegal activity until the first 
"minute to two" minutes of his speeding investigation. (R. 160: 15). At that point in time, 
the only thing Metz knew for certain was that the Defendants were Hispanic, nervous, that 
the car smelled of air freshener and had out-of-state license plates. Metz's testimony 
regarding the cell phone, maps and gapped panel were all rejected by the trial court as either 
false or impossible. 
Officer Metz lacked the specific information to justify a warrantless search. See 
Robinson, 791 P.2d at 436. Possession of an air freshener is a legal activity, as common as 
having gas in the tank, apropos of nothing. Likewise, nervousness is not indicative of 
criminal behavior. See e ^ State v. Truiilo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1986)(Nervous 
conduct is consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior.); United States v. Dimick, 
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990 F.2d 1164, 1165 (10 Cir. 1993)(stating that "we are wary of the objective suspicion 
supplied by generic claims that a defendant was nervous . . . after being confronted by law 
enforcement officials . . .") . Again, Metz use of this observation as a basis of reasonable 
suspicion directly violates established Utah case law. See State v. BaumgarteL 762 P.2d 2, 4 
(Utah App. 1988)("... acting in a nervous manner in the presence of police is not sufficient to 
support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved in criminal conduct.") Any 
alleged nervousness on the part of the defendants is understandable considering that they 
were stopped on a relatively remote highway by a State Trooper and, according to both Ruiz 
and Bracero, were immediately asked if they were Mexican. (R. 160: 88, 50-51). 
Everything from being Hispanic to owning an air freshener does not support 
reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. See Reid v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 438, 441 
(1981)(Held that law enforcement could not base reasonable suspicion on factors which 
"describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers"); Robinson, 791 P.2d at 
438 (same). 
C. Lack of Exigent Circumstances 
Officer Metz's illegal search was also unjustified in that he was not confronted with 
any exigent circumstances. At no point during trial did the State produce evidence that 
Officer Metz lacked the means necessary for securing a proper search warrant. The 
availability of a telephonic search warrant is one factor in determining the existence of 
exigent circumstances. See State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
There was no indication that the car would be unavailable for a search should Metz have to 
wait for a search warrant. See Larocco, at 470. Furthermore, considering that Officer Metz 
was justified in detaining Bracero for the alleged speeding violation and for driving on a 
16 
suspended license, he arguably had some time to hold the vehicle while he attempted to get a 
proper telephonic search warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 752 (1979). 
D. Credibility of the Witnesses 
Rather than dealing with the traffic-related issues, Officer Metz conducted an illegal 
drug smuggling investigation. Even after failing to find any drugs, Metz continued his illegal 
search under the experienced hand of Officer Mangelson, his superior. Since we have 
already analyzed the problems with Officer Metz's testimony, it is worthwhile to briefly note 
what we know about Mangelson-related appellate cases, suggesting that this crew has a 
history of Fourth Amendment entanglements. 
For example, in Stat. /. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990), the court found 
Mangelson's testimony to be "unpersuasive" in light of the more plausible account given by 
other witnesses. In that case, Mar lson admitted that whenever he sees "unusual looking" 
individuals on the highways he would stop the vehicle regardless of whether the driver 
commits a traffic violation. See id. In combination with Arroyo, the case at hand and other 
reported cases, we begin to see a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations involving the 
Mangelson crew. See e ^ id; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Simms, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991); 
Cf United States v. Lyons, 7F.3d at 975-76 (10tfi Cir. 1993)(questioning whether 
Mangelson's stop was motivated by an unconstitutional determination to search rather than 
by legitimate law enforcement concerns). In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, 
based upon the witnesses, the trial court found what has been found before: unpersuasive 
testimony. 
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In conclusion, in the absence consent, probable cause and exigent circumstances, the 
search was unreasonable under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See Larocco, 
at 471. Accordingly, all evidence seized was illegally obtained and must remain suppressed 
pursuant to the trial court's ruling. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,488, 833 
(1963); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, this case presents no grounds for a reversal and the Court should 
affirm the dismissal. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of August, 1999. 
JERE RENEER 
Attorney for Defendants 
ALAN DAYTON 
Attorney for Defendants 
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